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Primary Challenge
about forty years after the Publication of the major abolitionist texts, now celebrated criminological classics, Angela Davis (2008, 3) suggested that the primary challenge for penal abolitionists might be “to construct a 
political language and theoretical discourse that disarticulates crime from punish-
ment.” This is exactly what Nils Christie, Louk Hulsman, Thomas Mathiesen, and 
Herman Bianchi have done since the 1970s, and their work becomes increasingly 
significant as processes of criminalization gather pace and prison populations grow 
across the world. In a climate dominated by penal populism, the scapegoating of 
the “other” (in Europe, normally a migrant), and the tendency to deal with social 
problems through punishment, abolitionist thought is as refreshing now as it was 
in the 1970s. Abolitionism continues to pursue the strategy suggested by Angela 
Davis, and while disarticulating crime from punishment, it elaborates alternative 
conceptualizations of crime, critical analyses of law, and radical thinking around 
the very nature, function, and philosophy of punishment. This multipronged theo-
retical effort has allowed penal abolitionism to survive and continue to develop 
within contemporary debates. Examples are found in contributions displaying an 
array of damning evidence against prison institutions, and demanding that it is 
the defenders of such institutions “who need to make the case for their retention” 
(Ryan and Sim 2007, 714).
Punitiveness, particularly when associated with the poorly understood concept 
of dangerousness, has been described as a challenge to traditional notions of human 
rights, “designed to shame and humiliate offenders” (Bennett 2008, 21). Following 
an abolitionist stance, it has been suggested that “not only should we be asking 
questions about dangerous offenders, but we should also be asking whether the state 
itself is becoming dangerous to its citizens as a result of its penal policy” (ibid., 22). 
Questions such as this, however, require the use of “social imagination,” which not 
only challenges official penal orthodoxies, but is also “forever open to debate about 
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new conceptions of social relations and justice” (Carlen 2008, xvi). Pain, as analyzed 
by abolitionism, returns in recent criminological literature in the form of violence 
and the threat of violence, along with the mechanisms of fear that are embedded in 
the very fabric of prisoners’ lives (Sim 2008). Punishment as mourning and crime 
control as cordiality (Ruggiero 2010) are given novel impetus through the proposal 
of models and practices of justice based on the idea of “encounters with strangers” 
and an “ethics of hospitality” (Hudson 2008). Crucial elements of abolitionism are 
found in the spawning literature on restorative justice (McLaughlin et al. 2003; 
Jewkes 2007; Wright 2008) and, last but not least, in high-quality postgraduate 
students’ dissertations: “Abolitionist thinking offers an important critique of criminal 
justice, one that is particularly relevant in today’s context, and deserves much wider 
recognition and coverage. Dismissing it because of its radicalism or utopianism 
underestimates its potential contribution” (Roberts 2007, 23–24).
It has been suggested that the activist ancestors of abolitionism are the men 
and women who fought against slavery and the death penalty and that its tenets 
are grounded in a variety of social philosophies that are primarily concerned with 
discussing processes of social development that can be viewed as pathological. 
Among these philosophies are those expressing the view that societies should 
support a rich plurality of activities, each valuable in its own right, and that each 
person should be treated as an end, not as a mere means to the ends of others. 
This Aristotelian and Kantian view would deny “that a society can be flourishing 
as a whole when some members are doing extremely badly” (Nussbaum 2000, 
106). Contemporary debate focuses on how to link abolitionist “radicalism and 
utopianism” with views of crime and the law embedded in the Western cultural 
tradition and its concrete, reasonable, options aimed at the reduction of pain. But 
what type of utopianism is legible in the abolitionist stance?
Utopianism of Action
When Homer formed his idea of Chimera, he assembled shapes and items of his 
daily life, of the surrounding world, and the specific cultural environment in which 
he was embedded. Thus, Chimera possessed parts belonging to different existing 
animals: the head of a lion, the body of a goat, and the tail of a serpent. On the social 
level, this may imply that our creations are hostages to our own material life and to 
the interactions we entertain with our fellow citizens and the institutions governing 
us. “Even the wildest imaginings are all collages of experience, constructs made 
up of bits and pieces of the here and the now” (Jameson 2005, xiii). In this sense, 
utopias may serve the mere purpose of making us more aware of when, where, and 
how we live. Thomas More’s Utopia is, in this respect, exemplary.
More’s notion that thieves should be spared capital punishment reflects the 
ascendant humanism of the sixteenth century, which afterwards culminated in Cesare 
Beccaria’s enlightened penal reformism. Discussing the “strict and rigorous justice” 
of England, More notes that, at times, up to twenty felons are hanged simultaneously 
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upon one gallows, and that very few thieves escape punishment. However, he also 
observes that, by “evil luck,” thieves are “nevertheless in every place so rife and so 
rank.” To destroy their lives is morally wrong, because the very system that denies 
them the means of living drives them to “this extreme necessity, first to steal, and 
then to die” (More 1997, 30–31). As in Beccaria, replacing the instruments of torture 
with the tools of labor is the suggested solution to this demonic cyclical itinerary: 
from poverty to theft, and from theft to death. In Utopia, justice is as swift as the 
enlightened reformers would postulate, with magistrates convening within a day 
of the commission of the offense, so that the logical continuity between this and 
the punishment inflicted is clearly perceived and internalized. Offenders are not 
eliminated, but become servants of the commonwealth, or they may be employed 
as soldiers, because the crafts of stealing and fighting “agree together”:
For this kind of men must we make most of. For in them as men of stouter 
stomachs, bolder spirits, and manlier courage than handicraftsmen and 
ploughmen be, doth consist the whole power, strength, and puissance of 
our army, when we must fight in battle. (Ibid., 32)
Finally, the most “heinous faults” are punished with bondage, which brings 
profits to the commonwealth through forced, cheap labor. Only after being “broken 
and tamed with long miseries,” and when it is perceived that they are “sorrier for 
their offence than for their punishment,” may those showing repentance have their 
bondage mitigated (ibid., 100).
Thomas More’s imagination, in brief, cannot distance itself from the prevailing 
spirit of conquest of his time: his emphasis on war echoes the eagerness of his 
contemporary colonial traders, while the punishments he devises reflect the necessity 
to tame and enslave the peoples of the new world.
There are, however, ambiguous assessments of utopianism, particularly if 
one leaves aside its common understanding as an impossible ideal project and 
neglects the undertone of abuse with which the term is utilized against political 
opponents. Marx and Engels (1975), for instance, while attacking Proudhon as 
a petty bourgeois utopian, admired the work of Fourier and Owen, where they 
detected the anticipation and imaginative expression of a new social order. More 
specifically, Engels suggested that German socialism owed a lot to utopian authors, 
in his view the most significant minds of all time, who prefigured many matters 
whose accuracy it remained for scientific socialists to demonstrate (Manuel 1979). 
From a certain perspective, therefore, utopia may be interpreted as a program that 
neglects human nature and its frailty, aiming at an improbable uniformity and purity 
of a perfect system, and lacking agency and overlooking the progressive power of 
conflict. From another perspective, however, it can be equated with a “trace” of 
the future, a mixture of being and not-being (Jameson 2005). It is in this mixture 
that penal abolitionism is situated.
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Abolitionism neither pursues a perfect system nor anticipates future uniformity 
or purity; its stance grants a central role to the notion of conflict. Implicit in the 
“trace” of the future, the being and not-being, is its challenge to the established 
penal order, which leads to the discovery of new grounds upon which novel 
confrontations can be launched. Action and conflict, in the abolitionist stance, do 
not lead to a final, unchangeable condition, but to unknown social interactions. 
Thomas Mathiesen (1974, 1990, 2008), for example, theorizes continual abolition, 
rebuilding, and re-abolition, on permanently new levels: a constant transition to the 
uncompleted. In this sense, abolitionism must inform each immediate objective, 
concretely linked to the long-term goal. To strengthen this point, the concepts of 
positive and negative reforms may help. The former contribute to the perpetuation of 
established control systems, and the latter to their constant erosion. In order for the 
long-term abolitionist goal not to be set aside, short-term reforms should therefore 
be of the negative type. “That is, when working for short-term improvements in 
the prison, one should in principle work for reforms negating the basic prison 
structure, thus helping—at least a little bit—in tearing that structure down rather 
than consolidating it” (Mathiesen 1986, 82). Reforms of an “abolishing type” 
contain the long-term strategy while dealing with short-term issues. Abolitionism 
implies that “there is constantly more to abolish, that one looks ahead towards a 
new and still more long-term objective of abolition, that one constantly moves in 
a wider circle to new fields of abolition” (ibid., 212).
A functioning public arena has been instrumental in the “utopian” fight against 
slavery, forced labor, and, in some places, the death penalty. It will also be crucial 
for the nurturing of an abolitionist stance and, ultimately, will allow us to say “no” 
to prison. Endorsing the Max Weber (1948) of Politics as a Vocation, Mathiesen 
(2008) concludes that political developments may be slow, but experience confirms 
that we would not have attained the possible unless time and again we had reached 
out for the impossible (Ruggiero 2010). In this sense, utopian thinking incorporates 
conflict and action; everyday, it informs attempts to improve and is the mirror image 
of an “unfinished” desire to change. I refer here to a celebrated notion forged by 
Mathiesen himself.
Abolitionist utopian action is epitomized by the unfinished, the sketch, the 
embryo of what is not yet in full existence. Mathiesen’s (1974, 13) premise is that 
“any attempt to change the existing order into something completely finished, a 
fully formed entity, is destined to fail.” The process of finishing, in other words, will 
lead back to the social order one wants to change. Oracles are given as examples, 
as they provide sketches, not fully formed answers. The first problem, therefore, is 
how a sketch can take shape and how it should be mobilized. If the existing social 
order changes while assuming a new structure, the second problem is how the 
sketch can be maintained as such or how, at least, its life can be prolonged. “An 
enormous political pressure exists in the direction of completing the sketch into a 
finished drawing, and thereby ending the growth of the product. How can this be 
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avoided, or at least postponed?” (ibid.). The solution to these problems is the core 
concern of penal abolition as action.
Treatment experiments are also unfinished while they are being carried out. They 
have no boundaries with respect to outcomes, and offer potential alternatives to the 
state of things, for example, in hospitals or prisons. As the pioneering aspects of the 
experiments are incorporated into the structure in which they take place, and as the 
outcomes are precisely inscribed in that structure, the establishment appropriates 
them. Finally, the notion of the unfinished can be applied to the building of alternative 
societies. Such societies, presumably, contradict and compete with the societies they 
intend to replace. Their being alternative, however, lies in the never-ending process 
through which they attempt to establish themselves, constantly experimenting with 
new features and values, rather than in bringing change to completion. “Completion, 
or the process of finishing, implies full take-over, and thereby there is no longer 
any contradiction. Neither is there competition” (ibid., 17).
Penal abolitionism merges utopian action with alternative conceptualizations of 
crime, critical analyses of law, and radical thinking concerning the nature, function, 
and philosophy of punishment. Such a multipronged theoretical effort may avoid the 
pitfalls that Bianchi (1986, 1991) identifies in the history of abolition. For example, 
abolitionists of torture favored prison construction. European philanthropists and 
benefactors studied the US prison system, admiring its humanity: “the gentle eye 
of the new middle class no longer accepted confrontation with visible cruelty, and 
preferred the indoor cruelty of imprisonment” (ibid., 149). But the expected benefits 
of imprisonment failed to materialize, as inmates were not turned into law-abiding, 
productive, or respectable citizens.
The very construction and type of building used for imprisonment 
produced an annual output of wretched and destitute people, criminalized 
and stigmatized, who apart from a few exceptions, were no longer fit for 
normal civil life. (Ibid., 150)
As de Tocqueville (1956) noted, after serving a sentence offenders remained 
among humans, but they lost their rights to humanity; people fled from them as 
impure, and even those who believed in their innocence abandoned them. Once 
released, they could go in peace, with their lives generously left to them, but that 
life was worth less than death.
It took abolitionists almost three generations to recover and muster the energy 
for new utopian action. A propitious chance presented itself toward the end of 
the nineteenth century. With the emergence of the medical model, psychiatry and 
psychology seemed to offer an alternative to imprisonment and all other forms of 
punishment. Prisons could be turned into therapeutic communities. However, this 
model of treatment entailed the suppression of prisoner’s rights and the corresponding 
expansion of the power of scientists of the mind.
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In the old days, before the medical model, a prison sentence was a prison 
sentence, and the inmate knew his fate exactly. In many countries, though, 
the enthusiasm for prison as a therapeutic community had produced the 
indeterminate sentence, making it possible for a delinquent who behaved 
badly in prison to face the possibility of a much longer stay in prison than 
the seriousness of his crime warranted. (Bianchi 1986, 150)
During the course of the twentieth century, after the initial enthusiasm for what 
appeared to be a process of decarceration, abolitionists realized that alternatives to 
custody were destined to become alternatives to freedom.
There is nothing utopian in attempts to redress “remediable injustices”: 
abolitionists do not pursue perfect justice; rather, they aim to enhance justice. Their 
focus on social interactions rather than institutions, on precise settings in which 
people live rather than official norms and extraneous professionals, locates them in a 
specific political and philosophical tradition. According to a distinction suggested by 
Amartya Sen (2009), there are contractarian approaches and comparative approaches 
to the idea of justice. The former establish general or universal principles of justice 
and are concerned with setting up “just institutions.” Total compliance of people’s 
behavior is required for such institutions to function. The latter approaches assess 
the different ways in which people lead their lives, actually behave, and interact. 
Sen describes a contractarian approach as “transcendental institutionalism,” in that 
it searches for the ideal institutions capable of forging a perfectly just society. By 
contrast, a comparative approach entails the search for social arrangements that 
satisfy people in their concrete collective lives.
When people across the world agitate for more global justice—and I 
emphasize here the comparative word “more”—they are not clamouring 
for some kind of “minimal humanitarianism.” Nor are they agitating for 
a “perfectly just” world society, but merely for the elimination of some 
outrageously unjust arrangements to enhance global justice. (Ibid., 26)
Comparison requires information, which in turn presupposes proximity to the 
actors involved in the process of forging ideas of justice. Abolitionists propend for 
this type of approach and action.
Abolitionism is a counter-idea offered by cultural workers who feel that “the 
delivery of pain, to whom, and for what, contains an endless line of deep moral 
questions.” Philosophers, Nils Christie says, should address these questions, even 
those who, faced by the complexity of problems, may conclude that not action but 
thinking is the only available possibility: “That may not be the worst alternative 
when the other option is delivery of pain” (Christie 1993, 184–85). Action and 
thinking, however, are simultaneous, as exemplified by Mathiesen’s concurrent 
work as an academic and an activist.
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Thomas Mathiesen, like other abolitionists, looks at conflict not as the expression 
of an inescapable power arrangement, but as a possibility for the release of counter-
power energies. His approach to conflict in prison is not led by pedagogical purposes, 
in the sense that his involvement is not aimed at raising “consciousness” among 
prisoners. Mathiesen’s praxis does not entail a rigid division of roles between 
researchers and the subjects studied, nor does it start with the assumption that 
the former will feed oppositional identity to the latter. Action is inherent in the 
research method adopted and those researched are the prime subjects involved in 
research as well as in action. Mathiesen’s is a different type of radical thinking, 
one that constantly translates knowledge about conflict into collective praxis for 
those producing it.
In an attempt to revitalize social research, echoes of this debate have emerged, 
specifically addressed to fieldwork surveys and ethnographic work. Problems of 
representativeness and translation have been highlighted, including the possibility 
that the subjects studied may conceal their views and acts, and researchers may 
misconstrue the vocabulary and meanings of those acting. Transformative research, 
we are told, “traces the concealed links between observer and observed, makes 
visible the invisible, seeks to break down the barriers between the social scientist 
and their objects of study” (Young 2011, 173). Utopian action, however, does not 
limit its task to bringing the narratives of its subjects closer to its own metanarrative; 
rather, it shares ample parts of those narratives ab initio. Unlike controversial 
“public” sociology and criminology, which attempt to align the interpretative frame 
of scholars with that of the “public” (Loader and Sparks 2010), utopian action 
implies that such alignment has already been achieved (Ruggiero 2012).
The utopianism of action described so far is based on a range of counter-ideas. 
Its origin is worth explicating.
Foundations
Abolitionism does not possess a single theoretical or political source of inspiration. 
Instead, it has a composite backdrop from which it, wittingly or otherwise, draws 
its arguments and proposals for action. The intellectual biography of Louk Hulsman 
reveals how his views took shape through the reading of some crucial biblical 
passages, where mercy is advocated while judgment and retribution are rejected. 
The Gospels of Mark, Luke, and Paul seem to provide an apposite theological 
underpinning for Hulsman’s abolitionism, which can also be assimilated to Saint 
Francis’ ecumenism and his view that thieves are not those who steal, but those who 
do not give enough to the needy. Radical theology, or the theology of liberation, 
provides additional sources of inspiration that are connected with the abolitionist 
arguments found in some giants of Western literature. With Bakunin’s anarchism, 
Hulsman shares the belief that the realization of freedom requires that political 
action be conducted religiously. In certain pages of Marx, Engels, Tolstoy, and 
Hugo, there are echoes of Hulsman’s concepts of redemption of punishment, self-
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government, mercy, and pietas (Ruggiero 2010). Hulsman’s system of thought, in 
brief, displays a high degree of syncretism.
An equal if not a higher degree of syncretism shows the intellectual trajectory 
of Thomas Mathiesen. His initial materialist approach develops into arguments for 
a pluralistic, interdisciplinary sociology of law. The writings of Marx and Engels 
constitute an ideal background for understanding Mathiesen’s work, which also 
draws on a variety of other theoretical sources. Because Mathiesen focuses on 
offenders and prisons, as well as on social movements traditionally excluded from 
orthodox notions of class struggle, his stance is an implicit critique of classical 
Marxism. His strategy of action, as we have seen, revolving around the idea of 
“the unfinished,” also distances him from orthodox revolutionary ideas. The 
originality of Mathisen’s work resides in the coalescence of research, action, and 
theorizing, which characterize his entire career as an academic and activist. His 
long involvement with KROM, an organization for penal reform, runs parallel with 
his relentless engagement in action research.
Nils Christie’s work exemplifies simplicity and intelligibility. When we write, 
he says, we should keep our favorite aunt in mind. Similarly, Peter Kropotkin 
argued that anarchist literature had to keep in mind the workers to whom it was 
addressed. Christie’s system of thought draws constant parallels between his 
abolitionism and anarchist theories of law and authority. The similarities are 
astounding: his critique of legal professionalism echoes the anarchist arguments 
against the proliferation of laws, while his appreciation of conflict as a resource 
brings to mind the anarchist idea that problems within communities can only be 
resolved if those involved possess sufficient autonomous resources to do so. One 
of Christie’s arguments is that communities and groups, regardless of their size, 
may find abolitionist experimentation possible only if the interactions within them 
are frequent and highly intense. In this sense, he expresses the purest of anarchist 
notions, namely, social life is improved when communities develop social feelings 
and, particularly, a collective sense of justice that grows until it becomes a habit. 
Christie’s abolitionism, in brief, can be located alongside an anarchist libertarian 
analyses of law and society, in total harmony with Emma Goldman’s views on the 
arbitrariness of punishment, Errico Malatesta’s argument that penal reforms will 
never erase the principle of revenge inscribed in prison systems, and Proudhon’s 
idea that principles of justice are constructed through experiences of interaction 
(Ruggiero 2010). This should provide a sufficiently precise understanding of an 
abolitionist view of restorative justice, the topic of the final section of this article.
Participatory Disputes
Restorative justice is essentially a process that brings the actors and communities 
affected by a problematic situation back into the condition in which the problem 
arose. In this model of justice, the parties involved decide how to deal with a conflict 
and how to neutralize its collective impact. Restorative justice presents itself as 
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an international network or movement, giving the impression that its tenets are 
diametrically opposed to those that inspire conventional retributive justice (Casey 
1999; McLaughlin et al. 2003). It is important to maintain a critical stance against 
such claims (Williams 2005).
In Wright’s (2008) classificatory scheme, restitution implies the return of stolen 
property, individual compensation consists of funds or services given to victims, 
and reparation comes about from constructive acts performed for the benefit of 
communities or state organizations. Restorative justice shuns the notion of “deterrence 
through severity,” a notion whose effectiveness and morality are dubious. It is 
also an attempt to “separate society’s efforts to prevent crime from its reaction to 
crimes when they occur” (ibid., 240). The philosophy inspiring restorative justice 
is that the harm caused by offenders should not be matched with an equivalent 
harm inflicted on them. Rather, the harm should be counterbalanced by “putting it 
right or making up for it”: this would “not merely denounce the offense, but affirm 
society’s values” (ibid.). In practice, offenders are required to make amends as one 
of the consequences of their act. Mediation and arbitration schemes in operation 
are based on the awareness that, in most cases, conflicts involve people who are 
known to one another. Criminal courts are deemed to be badly equipped to deal with 
such cases, since their procedures tend to concentrate on the incident in isolation, 
which “does not give people an opportunity to explain the ramifications which lie 
behind it” (ibid., 247). Most important, such schemes imply that communities make 
amends for their own deficiencies in the upbringing of some of their members, by 
offering offenders opportunities for training, education, and developing social skills 
and self-confidence. The respective amends made by offenders and communities 
are entwined, although “the emphasis is not on what is done to the offender but on 
what he does himself, and this principle may therefore be called making amends 
through self-rehabilitation” (ibid., 255).
One controversy surrounding restorative justice centers on the reluctance of 
victims to participate in schemes that they suspect are geared to the interests of 
other parties rather than their own. Once they realize that an offender-approach is 
predominant, they again embrace the view that the police force is the only agency 
able to deal with offenders. Abolitionists attempt to outflank this controversy by 
adopting a different informal justice philosophy and practice. Hulsman (1986), for 
example, believes the offender-victim dichotomy should be superseded by a view of 
crime as a “natural disaster,” namely, an event that requires solidarity mobilization 
for those affected and efforts to prevent similar events from reoccurring. The 
controversy about offender-led or victim-led restorative justice is also examined 
against the background of other considerations. For example, it is stressed that 
some “alternative” justice practices extend rather than reduce the prevailing justice 
system. In an overview offered by Shonholtz (1986), agency-mediation implies 
specific institutional actors, such as prosecutors or the police, who apply specific 
mediation programs and procedures.
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This model is built around the power and interests of institutional agencies: 
case referrals are generally coerced, disputant participation is often involuntary, 
and in the absence of the agency’s pressure, parties would not attend mediation 
sessions. In brief, agency-mediation programs are promoted not because they handle 
criminal referrals, but because those referrals are not seen as legitimate criminal 
cases. Such programs represent a direct extension of the justice system into the 
noncriminal, or civil, arenas, and stem from the recognition that traditional sources 
of social control (the family, the church, the neighborhood) are declining: the state 
enters nonstate areas. In this sense, programs of restorative justice may become 
new punitive tools rather than alternatives to punishment.
Mediation promoted by community boards follows a voluntary referral model 
and is characterized by a community-centered rationale. The model urges the 
commitment of social resources and the revival of collective responsibility. It 
aims less to suppress conflict itself than its early expression, while seeking its 
potential resolution. It links the justice process to community forums led by the 
need of residents to organize local conflict-resolution mechanisms. It sees the 
development and maintenance of community justice forums as a democratic right 
and responsibility of citizens. Moreover, this model relies on residents trained in 
value-building, communication, and conciliation skills; panel sessions are open so 
that all are given the opportunity to develop such skills.
Although institutional (or agency) mediation may help to dilute the crime control 
system and to stimulate local neighborhoods, in the abolitionist perspective it may 
also lead to unwanted developments. For example, it may paradoxically revitalize the 
penal system, instituting swift punishment without formal protections. It may also 
weaken social competence, transferring problems to official actors. Individuals are 
deskilled and made dependent upon external, state-funded, or state-licensed entities.
Within the restorative justice debate, another moot point is relevant. Most 
state-controlled programs are regarded as suitable for co-option into the criminal 
justice status quo, while the relevant community takes on a subservient role. State 
intervention exacerbates the role of institutions as dumping grounds for “people 
suffering from a wide range of human miseries,” while transferring community 
ownership of miseries and problems to professionals (McKnight 1995). In this way, 
“the criminal justice system compensates for the failings of economic, political, or 
social systems, which consequently deters the reform of these systems by removing 
people from open society who are its products” (Elliott 2009, 156). In this way, the 
community becomes an amorphous ideal, an acquiescent aggregation of citizens 
perfectly aligned with state agencies (Pavlich 2005). Restorative justice that is 
focused on community development “is less concerned with meeting the needs 
of institutions than it is with meeting the needs of the people involved in, and 
affected by, conflicts” (Elliott 2009, 164). Conflicts, therefore, should be seen as 
opportunities for establishing dialogue and seeking solutions, in a process leading 
to wider relationships and wider mutual knowledge. By subjecting conflict to the 
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skill and competency of trained community people, many of whom are former 
disputants, mediation enacted by community forums or boards is able to make 
disputants responsible for the expression and resolution of the conflict.
In sum, the abolitionist view of restorative justice is shaped by an underlying 
radical assessment of the existing system: “Criminal justice is perpetrator-oriented, 
based on blame-allocation and on a last-judgment view on the world” (Hulsman 
1991, 32). It therefore neither provides us with the necessary information relating 
to disputes, nor transforms contexts such that emancipatory ways of dealing with 
disputes can be identified. First, an abolitionist approach is oriented toward those 
directly involved—persons or groups who directly experience unpleasant events. 
This approach leads to the discovery of resources that can be mobilized to deal 
with such events and situations. Second, abolitionism must radically critique the 
idea that there is a commonality in extremely diverse situations that are currently 
criminalized. The label “crime” is attached to very different problems, which 
should be tackled by a variety of preventive measures. “To use punishment on all 
of them is comparable to treating all kinds of illness with leeches” (Wright 2008, 
242). Each problem or event is characterized by its own contours and features, and 
information about them is a precondition for different understandings of the acts 
observed and the practical responses to them. Yet, to design effective strategies of 
abolition and to project workable alternatives, Hulsman intimates that “we need 
to agree on what we are opposing.” What we now face is a state-run organization 
possessing the monopoly to define criminal behavior, to prosecute that behavior, and 
to keep select individuals in confinement. This organization, which is intended to 
protect society from those individuals in reality fails to accomplish what it promises.
Several procedures can be used to deal with trouble. Dumping is one of them, 
and is relevant when the issue that gives rise to a disagreement is simply ignored and 
the relationship with the disagreeing person continues. Exit is another, representing 
an option that consists of withdrawing from the unpleasant situation and terminating 
the relationship with the other party. Negotiation comes into play when the two 
parties attempt to settle the matter by identifying the rules that should govern 
their relationship. Mediation is yet another option, involving the participation of a 
third party who is asked to help to find an agreement. With arbitration, the parties 
appoint a third entity and agree in advance to accept her judgment. Finally, in the 
case of adjudication a third authority intervenes whether or not the two parties 
wish it (Nader and Todd 1978; Hulsman 1986).
The meaning that people who are directly involved attribute to a situation 
will influence their course of action. Also determining that action is the degree 
to which different strategies for dealing with trouble are available and accessible 
to them. Those involved may make a free choice only when not constrained by 
the requirements of organizations or professionals. In this respect, flexibility is 
desirable, as it allows common meanings to emerge while offering the parties the 
possibility to learn about each other. Hulsman argues that flexibility is often lacking 
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because situations are defined and dealt with in highly formalized contexts. In such 
contexts, the definitions of issues and responses to them are limited. In addition, they 
probably would not correspond to the ones the involved parties would elaborate. In 
brief, “trouble” is to be turned into a participatory dispute by those experiencing it.
Crime itself is a participatory dispute. In abolitionist thought, it must be defined 
in terms of tort. According to Bianchi (1986, 116), abolitionist purposes do not 
require that an entirely new system of rules be devised. “We already have one, 
waiting to be applied and adapted.” Lawyers and jurists, in this sense, are natural 
allies of the abolitionists, since they are capable of, and hopefully willing to 
“develop new concepts of tort which would be suitable for the regulation of crime 
conflicts, and rules for the settlement of disputes arising from what we used to call 
crime.” Bianchi appeals to psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers, calling 
upon them to adapt and rewrite their skills in ways suitable for conflict-regulation. 
“The new system would no longer be called criminal law but reparative law,” and 
would engage offenders in discussions around the harm caused and how it can be 
repaired (ibid).
He is thus no longer an evil-minded man or woman, but simply a debtor, 
a liable person whose human duty is to take responsibility for his or her 
acts, and to assume the duty of repair. Guilt and culpability should be 
replaced by debt, liability, and responsibility. (Bianchi 1994, xi)
Criminal procedure is based on a false premise of consensus: purportedly 
there is consensus on the interpretation of norms and values. In political trials, a 
dissensus model is used when generalized social conflict is sustained by radically 
opposed values. Such situations may evolve into a new system and therefore a new 
consensual order. Abolitionist procedure, in its turn, should pursue an assensus 
model, that is, a model for the resolution of criminalized conflicts, which implies the 
participation of the parties involved: “to the consensus model I oppose the assensus 
model, which posits an unending, never-accomplished search for interpretations 
of norms and values” (ibid.).
Opponents of such a model may raise predictable questions. The first is: “What 
are we going to do with the people who pose an immediate danger to our bodies 
and our lives?” These individuals, Bianchi suggests, would be placed in quarantine, 
where they would enjoy “all medical and social help.” The second question is: “What 
are we going to do when people refuse, and continue to refuse, to negotiate over 
the injury they have caused?” Those individuals will still be asked to participate, 
“not seven times, but seventy times seven”—as many times as it takes to persuade 
them. If it becomes clear that they are the only party responsible for preventing 
negotiations, the defendants may be kept in custody for debts “and must be released 
as soon as they are willing to reopen negotiations” (Bianchi 1986, 119). The third 
question is: “What will happen to judges?” Their help will be solicited only when 
the parties engaged in the dispute are unable to come to a settlement by themselves.
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From the sociology of law we have learned that this is the practice already 
in civil and administrative cases; so why not in criminal cases? The role 
of the judge, therefore, would be far more than that of a mediator … 
no longer a person who, god-like or father-like, pronounces verdicts of 
morality. (ibid.)
In a typology of injurious events, Bianchi first addresses cases in which minor 
harm is caused. In his view, neighborhood centers offer the ideal response to such 
cases, demanding that offenders repair the damage produced or return the good 
that was appropriated in an unwarranted way. According to Bianchi, restitution of 
property and restoration of damage settle the situation as it stood ante-crime, and 
this constitutes “a lesson in good citizenship.” Unlike Durkheim (1960), who sees 
restitutive sanctions as a means to reestablish relationships between individuals 
and things, Bianchi regards these sanctions as promoters of solidarity relationships 
among individuals. Moving on to “slightly more serious cases of injury,” the crucial 
role of “boards of citizens” in bringing the parties together is advocated. In such 
cases, the revitalization of civil law alternatives, designed for the resolution of 
conflicts normally excluded from the remit of civil law, would be necessary. Finally, 
in “serious cases of injury,” when emotions run high, it is imperative to thwart or 
neutralize violent public reactions and to avoid revenge.
Immediately after a serious violent act, public reactions can be so violent 
that the actor needs some protection in order to survive for the later 
negotiations.... In the old days Sanctuary served as a place of refuge where 
the perpetrator of a serious offence could go and live for a while in safety 
until negotiations could begin. (Bianchi 1986, 123)
Bianchi’s abolitionism does not imply that all disputes should be handled out 
of court; some conflicts may still require judiciary intervention. This might be the 
case when negotiations prove unmanageable, or when one of the parties is still in 
danger of being victimized. Under some circumstances, therefore, the right of appeal 
to a court should be maintained. In communities that are still unprepared to deal 
with their own conflicts or incapable of coping with their own damaging events, the 
institutions of criminal law will still be present. The criminal law system, in brief, 
would evolve into the extrema ratio solution, addressing the perpetrators of harmful 
acts who “prefer to go on being called criminal in the criminal law system, rather 
than being free citizens who declare themselves liable and responsible for their 
acts.” One must accept the reality that some offenders are just unwilling to make 
amends for the harm they have committed, for it would seem that for some people 
“the dull passivity of imprisonment is to be preferred to taking on responsibility” 
(ibid., 124–25).
Abolitionists contend, among other things, that a completely different system 
of crime control necessitates entirely new linguistic terms to prevent conventional 
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reasoning from creeping in. To make a new system of conflict resolution stand out 
against the conventional punitive system, Bianchi introduces one such term, eunomic 
(referring to good order and workable arrangements). This adjective is opposed to 
the terms anomic and alienating, which denote the nature of the official criminal 
justice system, and which frustrate the main participants in a conflict. The new 
system would be mainly composed of a set of integrative rules offering opportunities 
to all participants (Bianchi 1994). This argument takes inspiration from Roman 
law. Its eunomic nature is epitomized by the central role restitution plays in it. The 
Latin word poena (from which the pain and punishment in English derive) refers 
less to the type or intensity of the punishment to be inflicted than to the obligation 
to compensate the victim. Before its modern translation into physical pain, poena 
alluded to the penalty to be paid directly to the injured party, rather than to the 
vengeful sufferance inflicted by the state. Even the original meaning of the Latin 
verb punire is “see to it that the duty of poena be fulfilled,” for an offender could 
usually buy off revengeful punishment by settling the compensation.
Anything which today we would define as “crime” was in Roman law first 
and foremost classified as belonging to civil law. When Roman lawyers 
had the concept of crime in their mind, they associated it with the need 
for compensation, indemnification, amends, satisfaction, remuneration, 
or acquittal. Their last association might have been to the modern notion 
of crime as first and foremost an act demanding punishment, in the sense 
of willful infliction of pain by some authority. (ibid., 11)
Compensation and restitution, however, when taking place in institutional 
contexts, aim to restore the situation that caused the dispute in the first place. 
Hence the skepticism for the term “restorative justice” on the part of abolitionists: 
things must move on rather than back, we are told, toward the creation of new and 
better relationships, not to the restoration of the previous ones (Ruggiero 2010). 
In this respect, Christie’s argument offers a clarifying example. Let us imagine a 
computer deciding on guilt and delivering sentences. If correctly programmed, 
the computer will reach infallible decisions. “After guilt was decided, nobody 
would need to attend before the judge to listen to his decisions if they themselves 
had some mini-computers at their disposal. This means that chance is taken away 
from court-decisions” (Christie 1982, 54). There is, however, another possibility, 
namely the reprogramming of the computer, a circumstance that would show how 
imperfect the decision-making technology might be. What are the variables that 
would be given priority weight? Most important, who would decide what input 
would be inserted into the system? The following are some possibilities:
The UN in the General Assembly; the UN in the Crime Committee; 
regional bodies such as the European Council or the Union of the Arab 
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States; national parliaments; regional authorities; a random sample of 
the population questioned through the telephone or personal interviews; 
a sample from the municipality of the victim or the offender; a totality of 
those close to the victim or the offender; or decisions could be made by 
the victim and the offender in cooperation. (Christie 1982, 55–56)
Proceeding from top to bottom, the various actors listed above, who are 
hypothetically able to provide input to our sentencing computer, possess increasing 
familiarity with and proximity to the parties involved in the conflict. With the last 
option, however, we are faced with the maximum degree of proximity, and it is 
with this option that our computer would become totally redundant, as the parties 
concerned could talk directly to each other.
Conclusion
The concrete utopia practiced by penal abolitionists is situated between “being” 
and “not-being.” It is a “trace of the future” that may develop into full-blown 
alternatives to punishment, rather than alternative punishments. Their stance does 
not entail the vision of a final stage where conflict will be redundant and agency an 
obsolete weapon. Their utopian action presupposes that the process in which they 
engage cannot reach an end; in other words, it is devoid of a teleology of definitive 
pacification. Is abolitionism transgressive or subversive? It is if we believe that 
solidarity, mutual help, mercy, cooperation, social movements, action, resistance, 
and social change encapsulate a transgressive and seditious nucleus. It is not if we 
believe that all of these have made our societies what they are.
The abolitionist view of restorative justice is a consequence of the theoretical 
and philosophical foundations on which it is based (Ruggiero 2011). These posit 
direct participation of groups and individuals in processes of change, rather than 
the appointment of specialized personnel imposing notions of justice. Specialized 
professionals may manage to “restore” the social situation prior to the emergence 
of a problematic event, but will leave things unchanged, therefore perpetuating the 
conditions that led to the problematic event in the first place. The utopian action 
advocated and practiced by abolitionism concerning punishment brings to mind 
considerations found in anthropology with respect to war. War is an invention, 
and traditional or advanced societies, mild or violent peoples, and assertive or shy 
communities will go to war if that invention is part of their cultural repertoire: “just 
like those peoples who have the custom of dueling will have duels and peoples who 
have the pattern of vendetta will indulge in vendetta” (Mead 1940, 403). Similarly, 
punishment is an invention, and ultimately, “we need a new social invention” to 
replace it, because a form of behavior becomes out of date only when something 
else takes its place, and “in order to invent forms of behavior which will make it 
obsolete, it is a first requirement to believe that an invention is possible” (ibid., 405).
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